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Economic developmentThe current state of the development economics literature ascribes an indisputable central role to institutions.
This paper presents a formal model of institutional evolution that is based on the dynamic interactions between
formal and informal institutions and economic development; the main features of the model is consistent with
the fundamental theories that shed light to institutional evolution, namely the collective action and transaction
cost theories, as well as dialectics. As informal institutional quality accumulates like technological know-how,
while the level of formal institutional quality is chosen by the government to maximize welfare, subject to the
economic and political costs. The solution of themodel yields a punctuated trajectory of formal institutional evo-
lution. Simulations reveal that the extent of diversity in informal institutional quality across a country delays for-
mal institutional reforms. We also observe that, both the optimal quality of formal institutions and welfare are
higher the more homogeneous is the country with respect to its informal institutions or the cultural attributes.
© 2015 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.1. Introduction
With the increased contention about the inadequacy of markets
alone to deliver economic efficiency, the new institutional economics
literature (pioneered byWilliamson, 1985, and North, 1990) has gained
prominence since the 1990s. The policy counterpart of this has ap-
peared in the SecondWashington consensus, coined in the term: “insti-
tutions matter”. The intertwined nature of the relationship between
institutions and economic development has also been the focus of earli-
er scholars, such as Hayek, Veblen and Marx. While the role of institu-
tions on economic development has been acknowledged widely, the
analyses of the role of institutions have been mostly very descriptive,
however, as it is also very difficult to decipher as the cause or the effect
of economic outcomes in empirical studies. Nonetheless, numerous stud-
ies have demonstrated the significant association of themeasures of gov-
ernance and politywith economic performance. Although the channels of
association between economic outcomes and institutions have been sug-
gested in political economy, institutional economics and game theory
literatures, a unified formal model of institutional evolution vis a vis
macroeconomic dynamics has so far been lacking.1 This paper presents
an original formal model in a step to fill this gap in the literature.ipants of the seminars at METU
their valuable comments and
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ich however possess several ad-
een the formal and informal in-
ys.Economic institutions, formal or informal, are transaction cost-
reducing agents that contribute to economic efficiency by helping
agents to reveal preferences, form expectations and internalize exter-
nalities. Informal institutions are norms and traditions; they are the un-
written rules of the game and, shape the way economic agents interact
in social life or in production processes. Hence, culture encompasses the
numerous aspects of informal institutions that evolve slowly albeit con-
tinuously with the evolution of elements that are endogenous to a soci-
ety. Formal institutions, on the other hand, are thewritten rules and their
enforcement characteristics, ranging from constitutions to legislations
that regulate the interactions between the government and individuals,
and contracts among the private agents.2
While formal rules of a society can be changed overnight, the effec-
tiveness of those rules depends onwhether they conform to the prevail-
ing informal institutions or not. When in conflict with the prevailing
norms and culture, formal rules are usually not adhered to and thus
fail to deliver their proposed outcomes. Hence, formal rules cannot be
considered as institutions without effective enforcement. Boettke et al.
(2008) and Williamson (2009) both argue that informal institutions
are more dominant in explaining the development process than formal
institutions that need to adapt to the former for their effectiveness.3 In a
similar vein, Easterly et al. (2006) point at the crucial role of social
cohesion in the choice of the level of institutional quality that affects,
in turn, economic growth.2 Williamson (2009) defines informal institutions as private constraints and formal in-
stitutions as constraints defined and enforced by the government.
3 Boettke et al. (2008) argue that indigenously introduced endogenous institutions are
stickier (more path-dependent) than the exogenously-imposed or guided adoption of
institutions.
8 Adaptive change means that institutions evolve to eliminate new transaction costs
that emerge as economies develop.
9 Based on Arthur (1988), North (1990) argues that institutional inefficiencies arise due
tomultiple equilibria; bad luck in persistence of an efficient technology; lock-in; and path-
dependence.
10 Acemoglu distinguishes between the political and economic institutions, the former of
which determines de-jure and the latter represents de-facto political power.
11
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by modeling formally the differential patterns of the endogenous evolu-
tion of formal and informal institutions in relation with economic
development.4 We conjecture that the path-dependent pattern of
formal institutions gets punctuated when economic inefficiencies lead
reform pressures to build up. Such a pattern of institutional change is
consistent with the fundamental arguments in the institutional
economics literature that can be summarized as follows: i) formal
institutional reforms may be costly for at least some part of the society
due to the creative destruction that are likely to be generated by those
reforms; ii) given continuous economic progress, the persistence or
time-dependence of institutions resulting from the status-quo bias
leads to inconsistency and conflict within the production processes,
and hence pose a deterrent to long-term growth; and iii) a punctuation
in the path-dependent pattern indicates that the cost ofmaintaining the
prevailing institutionsmay eventually exceed the cost of reform. As a re-
sult, while economic growth may follow a continuous progress, formal
institutions are conjectured to follow a pattern that exhibits intermit-
tent changes, which is consistent with the observed phenomena.5
Although the common characteristics of formal institutions, which
are called the best-practicewith regard to their ability to reduce or elim-
inate economic inefficiencies, can be freely available information, not all
the countries are willing or able to adopt them. From a political econo-
my perspective, Levi (1988) argues that a government who expects a
long tenure has an incentive to improve economic institutions.
Holcombe and Boudreaux (2013) support this argument with an
empirical analysis; they show that the average tenure of an autocrat is
positively related with the institutional quality, suggesting that a long-
tenured autocrat's interests are likely to be aligned with those of the
encompassing interests. Olson's collective action theory (1982) argues,
however, that special interest groups may get empowered over time
in especially stable democracies, and engage in distributional lobbying
activities that favor status-quo and thus resist reforms, resulting in insti-
tutional sclerosis. Accumulation of such lobbies results in inefficient re-
source allocation. Similarly, Acemoglu and Robinson (2000) explain
the resistance of the politically powerful to institutional development
by the potential revenue losses of via creative destruction. Acemoglu
and Robinson (2012) refer to the same argument to explain the emer-
gence and persistence of extractive institutions.
Hall and Jones (1999) incorporate institutions as a factor that aug-
ments total productivity. This paper considers formal institutions as a
specific form of technology. Similar to the regulatory authority that is
responsible for technology adoption in Bellettini and Ottaviano (2005)
(BO, henceforth), the government in our model chooses the level of for-
mal institutions.6 Our model departs from BO in various respects, how-
ever. First, we solve a (politically-oriented) government's period by
period optimization problem, given that political choices are usually
not made with a long-term perspective. We assume that the income
levels of economic agents are positively associated with their degree
of influence on the decision of institutional reform.7 Second, we differ-
entiate between the evolution processes of the formal and informal
institutions.
We consider that reforming formal institutions is a form of techno-
logical change that may benefit some agents at the expense of others,4 Neyapti (2013) presents the first formal model that yields a punctuated pattern of in-
stitutional change.
5 Roland (2004) likens sucha pattern of institutional change to tectonic pressures build-
ing before an earthquake. Earlier studies that utilize the punctuated equilibrium concept
(originally developed by biologist Eldredge and Gould, 1972), to explain institutional evo-
lutionmostly belong to the political economy literature, and is pioneered by Baumgartner
and Jones (1993).
6 BO explain the process of technology adoption by the differential behavior of the
young and the old with regard to innovation and learning by doing.
7 While this formulation of lobbying power for collective action is simplistic, theorizing
endogenous coalition formation has been admitted to be rather difficult (see, for example,
Grossman and Helpman, 2001).as in creative destruction. Thosewhobenefit from the prevailing institu-
tional network resist the change via political lobbying activities. Since
short-tenured governments may tend to accommodate the demands
of an organized minority, this may hinder the adaptive changes in for-
mal institutions.8 Institutional persistence is punctuated once the costs
of maintaining the status-quo exceed the cost of reform.9
The literature on institutional evolution ranges from the adaptive
approach of North (1990) to the historical and path-dependence ap-
proaches, exemplified by Kuran (2004), and the political-economy ap-
proach of Acemoglu (2006). Acemoglu proposes a framework of
institutional change where the society is composed of three classes:
the workers, the middle-class and the elite. Both the elite and the mid-
dle class invest, but their productivities differ. Inefficiencies arise in the
formof the elite's rent extraction and/or property rights enforcement, or
preventing the technology adoption by themiddle class. The probability
of a political power shift (from, elite to themiddle class) develops as the
middle class incomes rise. The change of institutions is explained by the
middle class ending the domination of the elite with some exogenous
probability. Institutions are hence modeled by Acemoglu primarily as
the agents of income distribution, rather than being determined
by it.10 Other formal models of institutional evolution usually utilize a
game-theoretic framework. Desierto (2005)models the evolution of in-
stitutional and technological change together, albeit without any con-
sideration of interest groups. Yao (2004) models institutional change
in relation to the welfare distribution. These two studies, however, do
not differentiate between the evolution of formal and informal institu-
tions. Given that a game itself imposes a built-in institutional structure,
this paper does not adopt a game-theoretic approach.11
Hence, this paper differs from the existing literature in several as-
pects. First, it extends the framework of Neyapti (2013) bymodeling ex-
plicitly the interactions between the formal and informal institutions,
on the one hand, and each of their relation with the economic develop-
ment process, on the other.12 Second, wemodel explicitly the cost of in-
efficiency that arises from the inconsistencies between the two types of
institutions.13 In order to model the interest group dynamics, we con-
sider, for simplicity, two economic sectors or social groups that are dis-
tinguished by the initial levels of their capital and informal institutional
development. The differential developments of two groups' informal in-
stitutions identify their business culture or the way these groups con-
duct business, which, combined with different levels of physical
capital, account for the differences in their modes of production.14 The
differences in themode of production across the sectors thus imply dif-
ferent preferences, underlying the diverse demands for formal institu-
tions. By contrast, the supply of formal (economic) institutions, which
constitute the legal aspects of production relations, is common to the
economy. Formal institutions are chosen by the government toAs Aoki (2007) argues, institutions are “not summary representations of exogenous
data of the game such as technology andpreferences, but a summary representation (rules
cum beliefs) regarding how the game is being played”.
12 The taxonomy of formal and informal institutions studied here does not coincidewith
that of political and economic institutions in Acemoglu (2006). We conjecture that formal
institutions that are once supported by powerful interest groups may eventually pose a
political constraint for their own actions due to the dynamics of the economics and inter-
est groups. This highlights the importance of taking into account the evolution of informal
institutions as distinct from that of formal institutions. Mathers and Williamson (2011),
Williamson and Mathers (2011) and Williamson and Kerekes (2011) also emphasize
the distinction between formal and informal institutions.
13 Kane (1988) provides a thorough discussion of a similar dialectical process in the con-
text of financial regulation.
14 The term mode of production, as in historical materialism, stands for the combination
of production relations and factors of production.
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tionately by the powerful interest groups that have privileged access
to resources.15 Differential growth patterns of the two groups' informal
institutions, may however lead to shifts in the size of their relative in-
comes and thus relative political powers over time, which in turn
could affect the path of institutional changes.16
The main implication of the current model is that, ceteris paribus,
the highest levels of welfare and formal institutional quality are accom-
panied by homogeneity in informal institutions across the society. The
current framework highlights the important role of the level and het-
erogeneity of informal aspects of production relations on economic de-
velopment; socio-economic and cultural homogeneity spurs growth via
effective institutional reform. Thefinding of the paper shed light onwhy
convergence occurs between countries that have similar norms. They
also conform to the studies that demonstrate the negative effects of
social and political heterogeneity on economic development (see, for
example, Horowitz, 1985; Montalvo and Reynal-Querol, 2005). The re-
mainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the
model and provides the implications. Section 3 concludes.
2. The model
Consider an economy that consists of two sectors, or regions, denot-
ed by j (j = 1,2), the first of which is less capital-intensive than the
second.17 For purposes of simplicity, we rule out migration and spill-
overs between these sectors. The production function of sector j is
given by:




; where f 0N 0 and f ″b 0 ð1Þ
where y j is the level of output and k j is the sector-specific level of capital
(physical and/or human) per-capita in sector j, and f is a function that is
assumed to exhibit diminishing returns. Out key assumption is that the
level of technology in sector j (A j) is determined by the quality of pro-
duction relations determined by F and N j that stand for the formal and
informal quality of institutions, respectively.18 F represents the formal
quality of organizational structure, which are the legislation or written
contracts; and N j represents the quality of the operational characteris-
tics of the production relations that are determined by the web of
norms in that sector.19 Since developments in physical capital necessi-
tate appropriately skilled labor toworkwith it, physical and human cap-
itals are complementary to each other.20 We further assume that the15 In Neyapti (2013), the political economy aspect of institutional evolution is implicit in
the cost function of formal institutional change.
16 See Neyapti (2013) for some quantified examples of formal institutional changes that
exhibit a punctuated pattern. Several advanced economies also offer recent evidence of
conflict in their production relations in the form of formal institutional reforms not catch-
ing up with the level of economic sophistication. The slow progress with regard to fiscal
reforms in the European Union and that with regard to the financial regulatory reforms
in Japan and theUSare cases in point. The great recessionhas also revealed the inconsisten-
cy between the state of financial progress and the institutional mechanisms that are sup-
posed to deal with their externalities, among other institutional deficiencies.
17 The sectors can be identified as modern versus traditional; or tradable versus non-
tradable. In a global context, one may also consider the divide as the North and the South,
indicating differentN's but a level of F being either internationally proposedby a global au-
thority or conceived as the best-practice.
18 The quality of both F and Nj is measurable on a cardinal scale, where increasing num-
bers reflect increased ability to reduce transaction costs.
19 See Granville and Leonard (2010), for example, for empirical evidence on the
endogeneity of technology to informal institutions in Russia.
20 An example inpoint is in regard to the invention of Kodak camera, which led people to
realize the importance of protecting their privacy against “Kodaking” (being taken a pic-
ture of without permission) that led to the legal right to privacy. The story shows how
norms followed technology, which was then followed by a legal adjustment. Another ex-
ample can be found in Danielson et al. (2009) in the context of biotechnology and chang-
ing societal norms. The FDI literature also presents arguments supportive of the norms
changing with capital accumulation: FDI flows are often accompanied by intense training
in the host country; they are hence argued to result in technological as well as organiza-
tional diffusion.evolution of N j depends on k j, as in the process of technological
know-how, or embodied technological change. Thus, the accumulation
process of N j is given by:
Njt ¼ Njt−1 þ g kjt
 
; where g0 kjt
 
N 0 and g″ kjt
 
b 0: ð2Þ
Hence, the sectors, or the regions, of the economy differ with respect
to their social and physical capital stocks:Nj and kj, respectively, in addi-
tion to the saving rates as will be shown below. For analytical simplicity
and tractability, we avoid additional forms of heterogeneity and assume
that the same type of product is produced in both sectors and that there
is no exchange between the sectors; hence the price is fixed and nor-
malized to one.21
A representative household in each sector consumes and saves
(invests) its disposable income. Hence, the market clearing condition
for sector j is given by:
c jt þ i jt þ ψ ΔFt ; Ft−1=Njt ; yjt
 
¼ yjt ð3Þ
where c and i stands for consumption and investment (or savings),
respectively. Given the investment for group j:
i jt ¼ s jy jt ; ð4Þ
The capital stock of sector j accumulates as:
kjtþ1 ¼ 1−δð Þkjt þ i jt : ð5Þ
The function ψ represents the cost of institutional reform that is paid
by sector j proportional to each sector's income level. The cost depends
on both the magnitude of change in the level of formal institutions and
the extent of inconsistency between formal and informal institutions,
given by the term (Ft/N tj). More explicitly, the cost function for sector
(or regions) j is:











yjt ;where 0 b γ1;2 b 1 ð6Þ
The first term of Eq. (4) stands for the administrative cost of changing
F that accrues to sector j, as a tax on its income. Tax revenues are then
used by the government for the purpose of financing the institutional
reform.22 The second term of the expression stands for the extent of
economic inefficiency, measured as a portion of income in sector j,
arising from an inconsistency between F and N j; increasing the ratio
(Ft − 1/N tj) implies increasing consistency in the institutional network
of sector j (assuming that the formal institutions in a framework of en-
dogenous institutional reform are likely to be bounded from above by
the existing norms).23 Given F, this ratio continues to fall asN j increases
with capital accumulation, which implies increasing inconsistency be-
tween the two types of institutions and hence increasing inefficiency
in the mode of production. The second part of the cost function can be
interpreted as the welfare loss of group j from operating with the
existing level of formal institutional quality. Adverse selection and21 This assumption is necessitated, given the level of the complexity of the dynamics in-
volved in the model. Since the focus of the model is to generate differential demands for
institutional reform, which we achieve by introducing different initial level and progress
of technological development, additional complication via exchange across sectors is
avoided to keep the model parsimonious.
22 The government sector is not explicitlymodeled here; the only role of the government
is to tax in order to finance the institutional change. Hence, jG ¼ Tt ¼ γ1½ðFt−Ft−1Þ∑
j
y jt ,
where the right hand side denotes the total administrative cost of changing F.
23 In a similar fashion, though without making a distinction between formal and infor-
mal institutions, Desierto (2005) considers the homogeneity of institutional infrastructure
or environmental proximity in modeling technological evolution.
24 Given the level of the complexity of the current model, we refrain from introducing
political factors that could be consider in addition to the economic differences between
the groups. This feature is to be studied in a separate paper.
25 Both the roots are too long to report here, but available from the author upon request.
26 The sample of initial values that are used in the simulation analysis are reported in
Appendices 2 and 3. Alternative set of trajectories based on of different initial values,
which we do not include in the paper in the interest of space, can be provided upon re-
quest. We note below, however, some of the general observations based in the results of
the changes in the initial values.
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to cope with the new types of transaction costs that emerge as the eco-
nomic activity gets more advanced. If formal and informal institutions
are entirely consistent with each other, the cost becomes zero and wel-
fare loss is nil. So long as (Ft − 1/N tj) b 1, however, the inefficiency arising
from maintaining F (the status-quo bias) is weighted by the optimizer
against the cost of reforming F (the first term); the reform takes place
if the former cost is more than the latter.
Combining Eqs. (3), (4) and (6), the consumption function can be
written as:




 yjt : ð7Þ
2.1. The government's problem
The government chooses Ft in order to maximize the sum of local
utilities over a given incumbency period. Such short-sighted govern-
ment behavior can be justified for the case of democratic countries
where governments face a positive probability of losing the elections




UG ¼ u c1t
 þ u c2t ; ð8Þ




¼ ln c jt
 
: ð9Þ
We assume that the per capita income of each group is of a Cobb–
Douglas form. Hence, Eq. (1) is rewritten as:





where θmeasures the contribution of technology to income, and α rep-
resent the income share of capital, respectively, where we assume that
the condition: 2θ + α = 1 holds to ensure constant returns to scale.








 1−s−γ1  Ft−Ft−1½ −γ2  1−
Ft−1
Njt
" # ! !
ð10Þ
where k j is given in Eq. (5) and the evolution of the informal institution,
Nj, is given explicitly as:
Njt ¼ Njt−1 þ bj log kjt
 
ð20Þ
where bj (0 b b j b 1) stands for the speed of learning by doing in sector j.









1−s1−γ1 Ft−Ft−1½ −γ2 1−
Ft−1
N1t





1−s2−γ1 Ft−Ft−1½ −γ2 1−
Ft−1
N2t
" # ! !
:
ð11Þ
Eq. (11) is solved subject to Eq. (2'). Assigning equal weights to
the utilities of the two income groups, which are differentiated on the
basis of their N, k and y, amounts to assigning a greater weight to the
group with relatively higher income (per representative household).
Because the economic power usually determines the political power,we consider that the preference of the economically dominant sector
plays a dominant role in the decision of the government that cares
about its re-electability.24 The optimization is performed given the fol-
lowing admissibility constraints:
c jt N 0 ; and Ft ≥ Ft−1;
where the second constraint indicates that the institutional reform is
made only to increase the quality of formal institutions; we call this
the irreversibility condition.
The dynamics of themodel can be summarized as follows:N evolves
with the contemporaneous value of k (Eq. (2')), whose accumulation
depends on the past value of F (due to Eqs. (1'), (5) and (6)); the choice
of F depends on the contemporaneous level of N, which together with F,
determines y (Eq. (1')) in the next period.
The maximization problem outlined in Appendix 1 yields the dy-
namic expression (Eq. (15)). We use the MATLAB software to solve
this expression for the optimum Ft (Ft⁎). The solution of Ft⁎ involves
two roots, although only one of these roots satisfies the admissibility
constraints reported above.25 We perform a simulation analysis to ob-
tain the evolution trajectory of Ft⁎ and its relation with the rest of the
model parameters are obtained from the comparative statics that are
obtained as closed-form equations.
Table 1 summarizes the feasible ranges of parameter values we use
to simulate the optimum solution of the model.
The simulation process is summarized as follows.
i) From the set of feasible values of the model parameters (β, θ, δ,
α j, b j, s j, γ1 and γ2), cross-combinations are selected incremen-
tally, along with the (pre-determined) initial (t − 1) values of
k t
j, N tj and F.
ii) The non-depreciated portion of initial capital ((1− δ) k t − 1j ), the
saving rate (s j) and the initial income level (y t − 1j ) determines
the level of k tj in each period t (using Eqs. (4) and (5)).
iii) Given N t − 1j and k tj, N tj is determined via Eq. (2).
iv) Given k tj,N tj and their initial values, the government chooses Ft to
maximize the weighted total utility of consumers; that is,
Eq. (15) is solved for Ft.
v) If Ft satisfies the admissibility conditions, yt + 1j is determined
based on k tj, N tj and optimal Ft via Eq. (1'). (If not, the loop goes
back to step i).
vi) The next period values are determined as the loop continues with
step ii, taking the previous set of simulations as the initial values.
The simulations yield 784,000 data points that allow us to report
several remarks with reasonable conviction. The following section sum-
marizes the results of the simulation analysis.
2.2. Simulation analysis
Given the initial values of {F, k1, k2,N1,N2}, where k01 b k01 andN01 b N02
and hence y01 b y02,26 the optimum trajectories for the two sectors can
further be differentiated on the basis of b j's. It is possible that b j is higher
for the backward region than the other, reflecting either the desire of
the former to catch up with the developed region or the convergence
factor. As a result, N1 may grow faster than N2 and hence y1 may catch
Table 1




δ 0.1 Rate of depreciation
θ [0.1, 1.0] Contribution of technology to output
γi (i = 1,2) [0.01–1.0] Cost of changing institutions (γ1); the economic cost
of existing institutional inconsistency (γ2)
α j [0.1–0.5] Share of capital in sector j's income
b j [0.1–1] Rate of learning in sector j
sj [0.1–0.7] Rate of saving in sector j
Assumption for the CRTS technology (2θ + αj) = 1.
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nomic or political power switch, and thus the utility weights in the op-
timization problem, between the two groups.27
Given the set of parameter ranges provided in Table 1 and a set of
initial values, Appendix 2 provides a sample of trajectories obtained
for F *, y1, y2, N1 and N2. The simulations exhibit a punctuated pattern
of change in F *, corresponding to the relatively smoother transitions
in y j's and N j's. Next, we investigate the effects of the alternative sets
of initial values. Ceteris paribus,we observe that an increase in the initial
value of N1, that is, smaller (N1/N2), leads to a faster and greater reform
in F. In addition, we observe that the initial values of F do not play a
major role for the eventual values of F * or the y j's that are attained.
We also observe, however, that F changes faster the higher are learning
and the saving rates. The latter observation implies that, ceteris paribus,
countries may eventually convergence towards similar levels of formal
institutional quality; but, conditional, rather than absolute, convergence
takes place and such convergencemay not be accompanied by a domes-
tic convergence in the income levels.
Remark 1. Culturally more homogenous countries can reform formal
institutions more and faster.
Remark 2. Regardless of the income and cultural differences, optimal
levels of F increases with improved learning by doing.
The exercise also shows that various scenarios (not shown) are pos-
sible regarding income trajectories; for example, the y j's may converge
while N j's trajectories may cross-over each other, depending on the ini-
tial values and alternative parameter combinations.28 Examples to the
pattern of formal institutional change indicated by the current model
can be found in several empirical analyses, such as the legal indices of
central bank independence of Cukierman et al. (1992, 2002); the
index of bank regulation and supervision quality of Neyapti and
Dincer (2005); and polity index of Marshall et al. (2011).29
We next perform simulations performed over all the feasible param-
eter ranges of the model, which reveal additional interesting observa-
tions. We report below those results that are robust to the changes in
initial values of the variables. First, the comparative statics analysis,
based on the partial derivatives of the expression for F *, reveals that
Ft⁎ is positively related with θ, whereas it is negatively related with s j,
N j, y j and γ1. These are all expected signs, where the negative relation-
ship with s j, N j and y j indicates the substitution effect. The effect of γ2
on F, however, is not definitive; ceteris paribus, the increasing cost of27 Williamson (2009) provides a comparative study of the status of F andN in a sample of
countries, noting that in themajority of developed countries F lags behind N, whereas the
reverse holds inmost of the developing countries. The current framework allows for both
cases as the findings of the analysis remain robust across them.
28 In the interest of space, we provide only one of these calibration results in Appendix 2;
further simulations are available from the author upon request.
29 Graphical representation of the evolution trajectories these institutional attributes are
reported in Neyapti (2013).economic inefficiency arising from maintaining formal institutions
that are inconsistent with the informal quality of institutions may or
may not lead to formal institutional reform, depending on the rest of
the parameters and initial values.
The simulation methodology also allows us to investigate the
relationship of formal institutional quality with income distribution
(y1/y2) and cultural heterogeneity, the latter of which we measure by
the divergence between the informal institutions across the regions
(N1/N2). Cultural homogeneity implies the networking intensity in the
society, or the value of social capital; while the lack of it implies the
lack of trust and thus increased transaction costs in production relation.
The most interesting findings of this paper emerges to be the positive
relationship between F * and (N1/N2). Given the positive relationship
between F * and welfare, we also observe that (N1/N2) and welfare
are positively related. More interestingly, as the relationship between
(N1/N2) and F * appears to exhibits an inverse-bell shape, the upper
end of the F* values are associated with (N1/N2) values close to one.
Appendix 3 (Figs. A3.1 and A3.2) presents these results graphically
based on the simulation data.30
Remark 3. The highest feasible levels of optimal formal institutional
quality and welfare are associated with high cultural homogeneity.
We note also, however, that as (N1/N2) increases, the response of F *
to the economic cost of inconsistency between F and N (∂F */∂γ2) turns
definitely negative, which indicates that high levels of cultural homoge-
neity is associatedwith greater resistance to formal institutional reform
(or to creative destruction) (see Appendix Fig. A3.3).
Remark 4. High levels of cultural homogeneity may be associated with
stronger status-quo bias or resistance to creative destruction.
It is interesting to note that, ceteris paribus, the effects of neither the
relative savings rates (s1/s2) nor the relative learning rates (b1/b2) alone
play a clear role on the level of F *, because a lower value of each of these
variables can be compensated for by another parameter.3. Concluding remarks
This paper presents a formal model of the dynamic interrelation-
ships between the formal and informal institutions, on one hand, and
between those and the economic growth process, on the other. Facing
some degree of heterogeneity in initial incomes, aswell as the economic
and political costs of reforming formal institutions, the politically-
motivated government, solves for the optimum level of formal institu-
tional quality.
The optimal trajectory of formal institutions implied by a politically
motivated decision making is consistent with the observed punctuated
pattern of formal institutional change. This pattern reflects the path-
dependence in institutions due to the status-quo bias and, as implied
by Olson's concept of institutional sclerosis, the resistance of the politi-
cally powerful to efficient institutional change or creative destruction,
only to be punctuatedwhen the calculus of consent dictates the inevita-
ble threshold for a change. Simulations reveal that the higher rate of
learning by doing in the relatively less capital-intensive, or the poorer,
sector of the economy is essential for closing the income gap within a
country — regardless of the initial level of formal institutions. Simula-
tions also show that greater heterogeneity across sectors leads to fur-
ther delayed reforms. By the same token, differential rates of saving
that, ceteris paribus, lead to growing socio-economic differentials limit
economic growth by causing delays in reforming formal institutions.30 Using some proxies, one can support these findings empirically by, say, the negative
association of ethnic polarization and governance (available from the author upon
request).
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ing countries appears to necessitate social cohesion, which is consistent
with the evidence (see, for example, Easterly et al., 2006). The simula-
tions of themodel imply the importance of cultural homogeneity for in-
stitutional and welfare improvement. On the other hand, at high levels
of formal institutional quality, cultural homogeneity may pose a deter-
rent to further reforms due to strong status-quo bias.
Besides analyzing the national development processes, the current
model can be utilized to understand the convergence around the
world based on the diffusion of the best-practice institutions. Many de-veloping countries possess a highly heterogeneous structure of norms
and income levels or dual economies. Accordingly, as many developing
countries lag in adopting and implementing improved institutional
mechanisms, the effective institutional convergence has been slow.
The evidence in this paper suggests that making convergence to high
income levels a realistic goal requires the development of the local and
national institutions in a holistic fashion, notwithstanding the idiosyn-
cratic characteristics of the different regions. Investing in arts and
education thus appears to be the key step to succeed the conver-
gence of informal institutions via spreading trust and business ethic.Appendix 1. Temporary optimization of F (Ft⁎)
We utilize the following identity in order to simplify the solution of the problem:
ln c1t
 þ  ln c2t  ¼ ln c1t   c2t  
where the term (ct1)1/2 ⋅ (ct2)1/2 is expressed as:
c1t  c2t
  ¼ N1t θ  N2t θ  k1t α  k2t α|fflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflffl{zfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflffl}
x1












Since the components of x1 are determined at time t− 1 and does not include the term Ft, the optimal Ftwhich is denoted by F * can be defined as:
F ¼ argmax ln x1ð Þ þ ln x2ð Þf g ¼ argmax ln x2ð Þf g: ð13Þ
Hence, from Eqs. (14) and (15), F * maximizes the following expression:








þ θ  ln Ftð Þ: ð14Þ
























77775 ¼ θFt : ð15Þ
The second derivative test proves that the solution of the above equation is a local maximizer.
580 B. Neyapti, Y. Arasil / Economic Modelling 52 (2016) 574–582Appendix 2. Sample trajectories of F * Nj and y j (for α2 = 0.3; s2 = 0.2; b2 = 0.5; and θ=0.3 and the initial values: {k1, k2, N1, N2, F} = {10,
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Y1:- - -. ; Y2:___ Appendix 3. Simulations for the temporal solution (based on 784,000 data points generated by the initial values {k1, k2,N1,N2, F}= {10, 50, 20,
60, 10}; and the parameter ranges:{α1,α2} ∈ [0.2,0.5]; {s1,s2} ∈ [0.1,0.7]; {b1,b2} ∈ [0.1,0.7]; and θ ∈ [0.1,0.9], where the increments are taken
as 0.1)Fig. A3.1 Diversion of informal institutions (N1/N2) and optimal F.
Fig. A3.2 Plots of welfare (vertical axis) against F* and (N1/N2).
a) F* on the horizontal axis
b) (N1/N 2) on the horizontal axis
Fig. A3.3 Diversion of informal institutions (N1/N2) and the sensitivity of F* to γ2.
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